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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The following parties or attorneys are now or have been 
interested in this litigation or any related proceedings: 
1. First Security Mortgage Company ("First Security") 
was the defendant below. On June 3, 1988, Leucadia Financial 
Corporation ("Leucadia") was substituted for First Security. 
Leucadia claims rights to the Property through a contract for 
purchase that was specifically made "subject to" the Lis Pendens 
filed by the plaintiff* First Security chose not to appeal and 
conveyed the subject Property to the plaintiff pursuant to the 
Trial Court's Decree of Specific Performance. 
2. Craig L. Taylor, Esq., Anthony B. Quinn, Esq: 
and Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Esq. of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 
previously appeared as counsel for First Security before the 
substitution of parties. 
3. Herbert S. Armstrong, William Melbourne Armstrong, 
Jr., Joseph F. Ringholz and Raye C. Ringholz are defendants in 
the action entitled First Security Mortgage Company v. Armstrong, 
et a h , Civil No. 9447, filed July 10, 1987 in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah. That 
action seeks a decree of quiet title to the property that is 
the subject of this action plus an additional 15.22 feet of 
property that was not deeded to First Security because of an 
erroneous property description, a decree of quiet title to all 
water rights appurtenant to the property, actual damages and 
punitive damages. The defendants are represented by Robert M. 
Felton, Esq. 
4. All other parties are reflected in the caption and 
all other counsel have entered their appearance. 
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Leucadia appeals from the following judgments and 
orders: 
1. An Order of Partial Summary Judgment signed on 
February 1, 1988 (R. 562-64); 
2. A Final Judgment and Decree of Specific 
Performance signed on May 6, 1988 (R.815-24); and 
3. An Order signed on May 6, 1988. (R.812-14) 
These judgments and orders ordered First Security to 
convey a home and the accompanying 11 acres of land to plaintiff 
William R. Kelley, Jr. 
Leucadia appealed on June 3, 1988, and on August 22, 
1988, the Utah Supreme Court notified the parties that the case 
was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, in that it 
is an appeal taken from a district court to the Supreme Court 
from a final judgment and pursuant to the Supreme Court's transfer 
of the appeal pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Leucadia claims that the trial court erred in decreeing 
specific performance of First Security's Agreement to sell 
property to Kelley on the ground that Kelley's tender of 
performance was ineffective and/or untimely. Kelley submits 
that the trial court did not err. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 2, 1987, plaintiff William R, Kelley, Jr. 
("Kelley"), a resident of Hull, Massachusetts, agreed to purchase 
from First Security Mortgage Company ("First Security"), a home 
and approximately 11 acres of land in Park City, Utah (the 
"Property") . The Property was circumscribed by natural boundaries 
— a spring and a stream — and fences. The home is located on 
the edge of the stream, which feeds a trout pond and irrigates 
pastures located on the Property. At the time the Agreement 
was made, both Kelley and First Security believed and intended 
that, at closing, First Security would convey marketable title 
to all of the land within the natural boundaries and fences. 
Before the closing, which was to occur on or before 
April 20, 1987, First Security learned that the deed through 
which it took title contained an erroneous property description 
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that did not coincide with the property that it intended to convey 
and Kelley intended to receive. As a result, neither the spring 
nor the stream could be included in First Security's conveyance. 
In addition, the adjacent property owners, the Armstrongs, cutoff 
the water supply to the pond and irrigation ditches and the pond 
dried up. Thus, if the Agreement had closed on April 20, 1987, 
as agreed, Kelley would have received a home and grounds with a 
discrepancy between the natural, intended and legal boundaries 
and the deed description. He would have also received a mud-
hole instead of a trout pond. More importantly, litigation with 
the Armstrongs was not merely a possibility, but was virtually 
certain. 
Recognizing these problems, and hoping to salvage its 
deal with Kelley, First Security spent the rest of the spring 
and most of the summer of 1987 trying to resolve the problems. 
Throughout this time, First Security and Kelley cooperated in 
every respect. Kelley accepted First Security's offers to extend 
the closing date on three occasions — two of which were made 
after the designated closing date had expired. In addition, 
Kelley, following First Security's advice, did not retain Utah 
counsel since he was confident that First Security would resolve 
the boundary and water problems and, once those problems were 
resolved, the sale would close. 
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First Security's informal attempts to resolve the 
problems were unsuccessful and on July 10, 1987, it filed a 
Complaint against the Armstrongs claiming that the erroneous 
legal description prevented it from conveying marketable title 
to Kelley. The Complaint also claimed that without the stream, 
spring and trout pond, the Property's value, aesthetically and 
economically, was substantially reduced. In addition to seeking 
reformation of the erroneous legal description, a decree quieting 
title to the Property in First Security and a declaration that 
First Security was the fee simple owner of all water rights 
appurtenant to the Property, First Security's Complaint also 
sought actual and punitive damages. 
In late August or early September of 1988, First 
Security's eagerness to sell the Property to Kelley and its 
willingness to resolve the problems abruptly ceased when appellant 
Leucadia Financial Corporation ("Leucadia") expressed an interest 
in purchasing the Property directly from First Security- By 
selling the Property directly to Leucadia, First Security could 
avoid paying a $45,000.00 real estate commission since its listing 
agreement with Gump & Ayers had expired, it could negotiate its 
way out of the Armstrong lawsuit and, at the same time, obtain 
a higher, cash purchase price for the Property. However, before 
these plums could be picked, First Security had to get rid of 
Kelley who, at the time, still believed that he and First Security 
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would cooperate in resolving the problems and closing the 
Agreement. Kelley had not retained Utah counsel — on First 
Security's advice — and he believed that a fourth extension of 
the closing date would be signed shortly since the last extension 
expired on August 31, 1987. He was wrong. 
On Friday, September 4, 1987, First Security sent a 
letter to Kelley demanding that the sale close by September 15, 
1987, or First Security would consider the Agreement to be null 
and void. The letter advised Kelley to retain counsel and 
"offered" to make title and water documents available for his 
or his attorney's review. The letter was sent over the Labor 
Day weekend and Kelley did not receive it until September 8, 
1987 — leaving him only five business days to close the $650,000 
purchase which was fraught with problems of First Security's 
creation. That day, he sent a telegram to First Security 
indicating his continued desire to purchase the Property and 
requesting a 30-day extension of the closing date since all 
previous extensions sought by First Security had been for at 
least 30 days. The next day he retained Utah counsel to evaluate 
the problems. 
In view of the complexity of the issues, it was readily 
apparent to Kelley that First Security's closing demand was 
unreasonable; nonetheless, Kelley's counsel made an appointment 
with First Security's counsel for September 10, 1987, to review 
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the documents concerning the water and boundary problems. First 
Security's lawyers failed to keep the appointment, but offered 
a conciliatory, albeit meaningless, extension of its demanded 
closing date for an additional week to September 22, 1987, By 
that date, the documents still had not been provided. 
Kelley was left with three options: (1) accept a return 
of his earnest money deposit, absorb his losses and walk away 
from a purchase he truly wanted to make; (2) accept a deed, pay 
the full purchase price and waive all claims against First 
Security — pursuant to either the merger doctrine or the express 
waiver demanded by First Security — despite the fact that First 
Security admitted in the Armstrong Complaint that the Property 
was less valuable due to the boundary and water problems; or 
(3) ask the court to require a conveyance to him of First 
Security's interest in the Property and interpret the Agreement 
to determine whether an adjustment in the sales price was 
warranted under the terms of the Agreement. The first two options 
required Kelley to accept First Security's unilateral 
interpretation of what was required of it under the Agreement, 
while the third option vested that interpretation where it 
properly belonged — with the court. 
Needless to say, Kelley selected option (3) and filed 
this action on September 22, 1987, seeking a decree requiring 
First Security to convey to him whatever interest it had and a 
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declaration of the parties' rights and obligations under the 
Agreement. The Complaint also sought an abatement of the purchase 
price and damages, if appropriate.1 Kelley also tendered his 
$124,000 down payment into escrow along with a demand that First 
Security perform as agreed and intended by the parties. He also 
caused a Lis Pendens to be recorded. In response, First Security 
agreed to extend the closing date to October 8, 1987, if Kelley 
agreed to purchase the Property "as is" and release his claims 
against First Security. Kelley refused and transferred his 
significant down payment to the Clerk of the Court. 2 First 
Security declared that the Agreement was void. 
On September 25, 1987, Leucadia made its first formal 
offer to purchase the Property and on November 25, 1987, the 
sale to Leucadia closed; however, the sale was expressly made 
subject to the prior rights of Kelley. 
The Agreement between Leucadia and First Security 
provides that if First Security loses this lawsuit, First Security 
must return with interest any money received from Leucadia and 
must indemnify Leucadia for all of its costs and expenses incurred 
1
 First Security and Kelley have settled the issues of 
an abatement of the purchase price, damages and attorneys' fees. 
Kelley has released First Security from those claims and First 
Security has deeded the Property to Kelley. 
2 To the credit of the Summit County Treasurer, he was 
able to invest the tender and earn an 8.61% annual return which 
was almost 2% better than banks were paying on money market 
accounts during the same period of time. 
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as a result of its purchase of the Property, In other words, 
Leucadia contracted to be made whole when Kelley received the 
Property. 
First Security filed a Motion to Dismiss Kelley's 
Complaint and Kelley filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Both motions were supported by Affidavits. On December 
6, 1987, Kelley's Motion was granted and First Security's Motion 
was denied. On January 20, 1988, the court entered an Order 
that Kelley was entitled to a decree of specific performance 
requiring First Security to convey its interest in the Property, 
but retained jurisdiction to determine, among other things, the 
rights and obligations of the parties under the Agreement and 
whether Kelley was entitled to an abatement of the purchase price 
and/or damages. The Order stated that First Security's conveyance 
could wait until final judgment was entered. 
Final judgment was entered on May 6, 1988, and First 
Security conveyed to Kelley the Property that it owned by special 
warranty deed plus the 15.22 feet caused by the boundary 
discrepancy by quit-claim deed. Kelley and his family now occupy 
the Property. On June 3, 1988, Leucadia was substituted as 
defendant for First Security and filed this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The Agreement Between Kelley and First Security. 
a. On or about March 2, 1987,3 Kelley, as buyer, 
and First Security, as seller, executed an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement for the purchase of residential property located at 
320 Snows Lane, Park City, Utah. (R.14-22) 
b. The Agreement contains the following terms: 
(1) "Condition and Conveyance of Title. 
Seller represents that Seller holds title to the property in 
fee simple. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be 
made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good 
and marketable title to the property, subject to encumbrances 
and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by a current policy of 
title insurance in the amount of purchase price." (R.14 3) 
(2) "Property sold xas is' without warranty. 
Title conveyed by special warranty deed corp form. Other terms 
to remain the same." (R.14) 
(3) "Current certified survey will be 
provided by Seller." (R.18) 
(4) "Closing to be on or before April 20, 
1987." (R.18) 
^The Earnest Money Agreement is dated February 20, 1987; 
however, an agreement between the parties was not reached until 
March 2, 1987. 
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(5) "Time is of the essence." (R.17 Q) 
c. Other relevant terms of the Agreement are 
as set forth in Leucadia's Brief, pages 3-6. 
d. In reliance on the Agreement, Kelley deposited 
$10,000 with Gump & Ayers and began arranging the funds necessary 
by liquidating assets. (R.276) 
2. The Property in Dispute. 
a. At the time the Agreement was signed, both 
Kelley and First Security understood the Property to consist of 
a residence surrounded by approximately 11 acres of grounds. The 
grounds are substantially enclosed by fences, a spring and a 
stream. The home is situated on the edge of the stream, which 
feeds the pond and irrigates the pastures located on the Property. 
(R.207-08, 275) 
b. Shortly after the Agreement wcis signed, First 
Security, in accordance with the Agreement, had the Property 
surveyed. The survey revealed that the quit-claim deed by which 
it acquired its interest contained an erroneous property 
description that placed the boundaries of the Property 15.22 
feet farther south than the actual Property which First Security 
and its predecessors occupied and intended to convey. (R.23-58) 
c. As a result of the erroneous property 
description, the spring and the stream could not be conveyed by 
First Security to Kelley. (R.194-95) 
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d. Moreover, after the Agreement was executed, 
the adjacent property owners sawed off a pipe supplying water 
to the pond and removed fish from the pond. (R.82) Consequentlyf 
the pond dried up and there was no irrigation water. (R.82) 
3. The Extension of the Agreement to Resolve Boundary 
and Water Rights Problems. 
a. First Security recognized that the boundary 
and water problems affected not only the value of the Property, 
but also its ability to convey marketable title. To give it time 
to resolve these problems, First Security, on April 22, 1987— 
two days after the initial closing date had expired — requested 
that the closing date be extended to June 1, 1987. Kelley agreed 
to the request. (R.19, 277 8) 
b. On May 28, 1987, First Security again 
requested that the closing date be extended to July 1, 1987. 
Kelley agreed to the request. (R.20) 
c. On July 6, 1987 — five days after the extant 
closing date had expired — First Security again requested that 
the closing date be extended, this time to August 31, 1987. 
Kelley agreed to the request. (R.21) 
d. First Security was unable to informally 
resolve the boundary and water problems with the Armstrongs and 
on July 10, 1987, it filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial 
District Court, entitled First Security Mortgage Co. v. Herbert 
S. Armstrong, et al. , Civil No. 9447 (the "Armstrong Suit"). 
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First Security sought the following relief: (1) quiet title 
to the Property and correction of the erroneous legal description 
so that the property description would match the natural 
boundaries; (2) a declaration that First Security was the fee 
simple owner of all water rights appurtenant to the Property; 
(3) damages resulting from drainage of the trout pond; (4) 
punitive damages in the amount of $50,000; and (5) attorneys' 
fees, costs and expenses. (R.23-59) 
e. In its Complaint, First Security claimed 
that because of the erroneous legal description, it could not 
convey marketable title to the Property and that the Property's 
value had been substantially reduced, both aesthetically and 
economically, because of the loss of the stream, spring and trout 
pond. (R.29-31) 
f. Throughout this period, First Security told 
Kelley that it was not necessary for him to retain Utah counsel. 
(R.289) 
4. The Dispute Between Kelley and First Security. 
a. On September 4, 1987, First Security's 
attorney, Craig Taylor, Esq., sent a letter to Kelley demanding 
that the sale close by September 15, 1987, or First Security 
would consider the Agreement to be null and void. First Security 
also informed Kelley for the first time that he should obtain 
legal counsel. (R.114-15) Before he received the September 4 
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letter, Kelley was under the impression that First Security was 
doing its best, including filing the Armstrong Suit, to clear 
up the boundary and water problems. (R.277-78) 
b. The September 4 letter was sent over the 
Labor Day weekend and Kelley, a resident of Hull, Massachusetts, 
did not receive it until September 8, 1987, (R.278) 
c. On September 9, Kelley retained David R. 
Olsen, Esq., of the firm of Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, 
to serve as his counsel in his transaction with First Security. 
(R.278) On that day, Kelley sent a telegram to First Security 
stating that he did not want to walk away from the Property and 
that he needed a customary 30-day extension before he could close. 
(R.288-89) 
d. Kelley's Utah counsel immediately contacted 
First Security's counsel. First Security agreed to provide all 
of the documents concerning the boundary and water problems for 
review so that Kelley could make an informed decision regarding 
the Property. An appointment was made for the production of 
those documents. (R.282-83) 
e. On September 10, 1987, Dan W. Egan, Esq., 
of Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, went to First Security's 
counsel's office to obtain copies of all documents in First 
Security's possession concerning the boundary and water problems. 
Mr. Taylor failed to keep the appointment. (R.282-83) 
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f. As a result of his failure to keep the 
appointment with Mr. Egan, Mr. Taylor extended th€> deadline for 
closing to September 22, 1987. (R.116) The requested documents 
were not provided by that date; nevertheless, Kelley wired 
approximately $124,000 into an account at Williamsburg Savings 
Bank so that the necessary funds would be available for the 
closing. (R.278-80) Kelley's attorney informed Taylor by letter 
that Kelley was ready, willing and able to close the Agreement, 
that the funds necessary for the down payment were on deposit 
with Williamsburg Savings Bank and he demanded that First Security 
perform as agreed. (R.119-21) 
g. On September 22, 1987, this action was filed 
seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties pursuant to 
the Agreement and a decree of specific performance requiring 
First Security to convey the Property subject to Kelley's claim 
for damages. (R.l-62) A Lis Pendens was filed the same day. 
The escrow funds were subsequently deposited with the Summit 
County Clerk. (R.68) 
h. On September 22, 1987, First Security declared 
the Agreement null and void and, on September 24, 1987, executed 
the release of Kelley's $10,000 earnest money deposit. (R.122-
23) Kelley refused to accept the release. 
i. On September 25, 1987, Leucadia offered to 
purchase the Property from First Security. The earnest money 
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Agreement between Leucadia and First Security, as amended, 
provides in part: (1) that Leucadia would pay a purchase price 
of $675,000, cash upon closing; (2) that if Leucadia purchased 
the Property, First Security would "use its best efforts to obtain 
a settlement, dismissal with prejudice or final judgment" in 
the lawsuit with Kelley in First Security's favor; (3) that if 
First Security lost the lawsuit, and the Property was conveyed 
to Kelley, that First Security would indemnify Leucadia for all 
of its costs and expenses incurred as a result of its purchase 
of the Property; and (4) that if Leucadia were brought into this 
lawsuit by the plaintiff or any other party, First Security would 
pay Leucadia's litigation costs, including attorneys' fees, 
(R.312, 493-514) 
j. On January 10, 1988, the trial court entered 
an Order granting Kelley's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and ordering First Security to convey the Property- The court 
retained jurisdiction over Kelley's claim to an abatement of 
the purchase price, damages and attorneys' fees. The conveyance 
was ordered to occur when final judgment was entered in this 
action- (R.562-64) 
k. On May 6, 1988, Final Judgment was entered. 
(R.815-24) First Security accepted the moneys deposited with 
the court and conveyed the Property that it owned to Kelley by 
special warranty deed and the 15.22 foot discrepancy caused by 
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the erroneously legal description by quit-claim deed. (See 
Appendix "A," attached hereto.) 
1. On June 3, 1988, Leucadia was substituted 
as defendant in this action and filed this appeal. (R.844-46, 
847-49) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Kelley submits that the trial court did not err in 
granting his motion for Partial Summary Judgment ordering First 
Security to specifically perform the Agreement to the extent 
that it could perform, while reserving Kelley's claim for an 
abatement in the purchase price and/or damages for trial. 
Leucadia argues that the trial court's decision granting 
a decree of specific performance to Kelley should be reversed on 
the ground that Kelley's tender was untimely and/or ineffective. 
As will be demonstrated below, Kelley's tender was 
neither untimely nor ineffective. In fact, it was unnecessary. 
The undisputed facts before the trial court concerning the conduct 
of the parties mandated a holding that the "time is of the 
essence" provision was waived. As such, First Security, before 
it could claim that Kelley had breached the Agreement, was not 
only required to provide Kelley notice and a reasonable time to 
close, but also to tender its own performance. The undisputed 
facts showed that the seven days provided by First Security was 
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unreasonable — these facts were untraversed below. Thus, Kelley 
was not in breach of the Agreement when he deposited his down 
payment into court and, through his Complaint, asked the Court 
to require First Security to convey whatever property it owned 
that was subject to the Agreement and interpret whether the 
Agreement required First Security to convey the property free 
of the water and boundary problems. If so, Kelley would be 
entitled to an abatement of the purchase price; if not, the full 
purchase price would be paid. 
Alternatively, Kelley claims that First Security could 
not convey marketable title which was required by the Agreement. 
First Security's inability to perform, relieved Kelley of the duty 
to tender his performance. 
Third, the "tender" attacked by Leucadia is not 
ineffective because it is conditional. It merely demanded First 
Security to perform as it had agreed to perform, that is, convey 
marketable title to the Property with all the pertinent water 
rights. It was submitted in conjunction with the filing of a 
lawsuit which asked the court to interpret the Agreement and 
structure the appropriate decree. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal must be viewed in light of the interests 
of Leucadia. It is not being pursued by First Security — First 
Security accepted the judgment below by accepting the money 
deposited with the Clerk of the Court and delivering its deeds 
to Kelley. Rather, the appeal is being pursued by Leucadia— 
an interloper whose contract reveals that it took its interest 
in the Property with express and full notice of Kelley's prior 
rights. More importantly, it entered into a deal where it has 
nothing to lose. 
Leucadia's contract with First Security specifically 
provides that Leucadia will be fully indemnified for any losses, 
including attorneys' fees, engineering fees, costs and interest, 
if Kelley prevails in this lawsuit. Leucadia also delegated the 
duty to pursue the lawsuit to First Security. 
Leucadia's contract was so precise that it designated 
the interest rate to be paid on all indemnified funds as the 
prime interest rate as was charged from time to time by Chase 
Manhattan Bank during the same time period. It is with this 
background that Leucadia seeks to disrupt the lives of the Kelley 
family and continue with litigation which the parties below wished 
to end. 
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The arguments raised by Leucadia seek to divert this 
court's attention from the import of what really happened below. 
What has never been disputed is that Bill Kelley wanted to move 
his family to Utah. He found property he liked, he paid for it 
and he was willing to fight for it. His financial ability was 
never at issue — it couldn't be because his money was on deposit 
with the court. Nor has it ever been disputed that Kelley relied 
on the Agreement with First Security to his detriment since he 
liquidated assets to meet the down payment. 
Instead of addressing these issues, Leucadia attempts 
to elevate the chaos created by First Security to a justifiable 
excuse for First Security's dishonoring of the Kelley Agreement 
and taking a better deal. 
First Security encountered a problem with marketable 
title and couldn't deliver what it had agreed to deliver. It told 
Kelley not to retain a lawyer and attempted to solve the problem 
without his assistance or input. After over five months of 
failure, First Security tried to pass the problem on to Kelley 
and demanded that he give up his rights to question whether First 
Security had honored its Agreement. Even under these 
circumstances, Kelley was willing to pay the price and take the 
Property. He sought only to have the court determine through a 
declaratory judgment action if First Security's unilateral 
interpretation of the Agreement was correct. If it wasn't 
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correct, Kelley sought the appropriate adjustment to the purchase 
price; if it was, Kelley would pay the full purchase price. 
In its effort to champion rights which the parties to 
the Agreement have long since resolved, Leucadia conducts a 
somewhat misleading discussion of the "tender letter." It focuses 
on one sentence and seeks to disregard every other word of the 
letter as well as the facts of the transaction. The letter is 
three pages and it was delivered in conjunction with the filing 
of the Complaint. It recites the history of the transaction 
and discusses the missed appointments and First Security's failure 
to deliver promised deeds and closing documents. It states that 
the closing date is unreasonable and petitions First Security 
for a reasonable time period within which to close. That is 
the substance of the letter. 
The letter cannot be separated from the Complaint which 
was filed on the same date. The Complaint seeks to have the 
court — not First Security — determine the meaning of the 
Agreement and award judgment consistent with its interpretation. 
There was no risk to First Security because the required down 
payment was placed under the control of the court to distribute 
consistent with its judgment. It is difficult to imagine a 
situation where the right to have the court interpret an Agreement 
is more appropriate. Kelley's rights would have been lost or 
compromised if he closed pursuant to First Security's demand 
-20-
since the Agreement specifically provided that its terms were 
merged into the deed. Kelley showed his willingness to close 
by giving the court control of the $124,000 down payment. 
If Mr. Kelley cannot petition a court for assistance 
under these circumstances, the remedy of a declaratory judgment 
is meaningless. The mighty's judgment becomes infallible because 
the time, expense and risks of litigation allow those in Mr. 
Kelley's situation to be bludgeoned into submission. This is not 
a policy the law should promote. For these and the reasons 
discussed below, the trial court's decision was guided by common 
sense and fairness and was correct under the law. 
II. 
EVEN THOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN KELLEY AND 
FIRST SECURITY STATED THAT "TIME IS OF THE 
ESSENCE," THIS PROVISION WAS WAIVED BY 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES. 
Time is of the essence in a land sale contract only 
if the parties so intend. That intention, or the lack thereof, 
may be demonstrated by a contract provision or by the 
circumstances of the transaction. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 
548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), citing. Century 21 All Western Real 
Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982); Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 
P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977). 
It follows that a specified time for performance may be waived 
by the conduct of the parties, thereby indicating that time is 
-21-
not of the essence — despite a contrary contract provision. 
Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d at 1126; Cline v. Hullum, 435 P.2d 152 
(Okla. 1967). 
For example, in Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 380 A.2d 468 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), the sales agreement stated that time was 
of the essence; however, because the title searches were 
incomplete by the closing date, the parties extended the.closing 
date for six weeks. At the end of the six weeks, the title 
searches were still incomplete. When the seller was told of 
the new delay, he didn't object. When the title searches were 
completed nearly two months later, the seller informed the 
purchasers that the agreement was "null and void." Id. at 470. 
The court held that the seller had waived the provision that 
time was of the essence: 
Even though the agreement of sale makes time 
of "the essence of the contract" this 
provision may be waived by agreement or by 
the conduct of the parties. . . . We find 
that appellant's [seller's] actions 
demonstrated that she "affirmatively assented" 
to settlement being held at some date later 
than January 14, depending on when Merkel 
[the attorney conducting the title searches] 
completed the title searches. 
Id. at 470. 
First Security waived the "time is of the essence" 
provision when it asked for and Kelley granted three successive 
extensions of the closing date — two of which were offered and 
accepted after the closing date had expired. Throughout the 
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period when First Security asked for extensions in order to 
resolve the boundary and water problems, the parties intended 
to carry out the terms of the Agreement for sale of the Property 
as soon as the problems were remedied. First Security even 
advised Kelley that it was unnecessary for him to retain counsel. 
Thus, Leucadia's "time is of essence" argument supporting First 
Security's termination of the Agreement is unsupported. 
III. 
BECAUSE THE "TIME IS OF ESSENCE" PROVISION 
WAS WAIVED, FIRST SECURITY WAS REQUIRED TO 
GIVE KELLEY A REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO PERFORM 
After compliance with the closing date is waived, the 
time for closing becomes indefinite and the party seeking 
performance must give notice and a reasonable period of time 
for the other party to perform before the Agreement is breached. 
In Tanner v. Baadsqaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), 
plaintiff (the assignee of the purchasers) sued for specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of undeveloped property. 
The plaintiff, over a period of several months, attempted to 
arrange financing for the purchase. During this period, several 
payments due under the contract were not made. Plaintiff informed 
the vendor several times of the assignment of the original 
purchaser's interest and of the fact that the plaintiff was having 
difficulty with financing and the defendant didn't complain about 
the delay. When the plaintiff finally arranged financing and 
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informed the vendor so that a closing date could be arranged, 
the vendor told plaintiff that he planned to sell the property 
to a third party and that he would not accept any money from 
the plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
finding that: 
[By] His conduct, the defendant had waived 
requirement of strict compliance with the 
dates of payment stated in the earnest money 
agreement . . . The court applied the rule 
that after such a waiver, the seller must give 
notice and a reasonable time to perform 
before he may insist upon holding the buyer 
strictly to the time requirements- The trial 
court concluded that the plaintiff would be 
entitled to specific performance of the 
contract. . . 
Id. at 347. See also, Three-O-Three Investments, Inc., v. 
Moffitt, 622 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Cline v. Hullum, 
435 P.2d 152 (Ofcla. 1967); Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 380 A.2d 
468 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). 
First Security, by its letter dated September 4, 1987, 
did not provide Kelley with a reasonable time to perform. The 
letter, mailed to Kelley in Massachusetts over the Labor Day 
weekend, informed Kelley that "First Security had no intention 
of proceeding with the Armstrong lawsuit, advised him to get 
counsel — despite its prior advice to the contrary — and 
demanded that the sale close on or before September 15, 1987. 
Thus, Kelley had only five business days to engage an attorney, 
to come to Utah and to close on the Property. Keilley stated in 
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his Affidavit filed in support of his Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that First Security's denial provided him an unreasonable 
period of time to evaluate the problems. This fact was 
untraversed by First Security. Further, First Security's 
preemptory notice sharply contrasted with the parties' prior 
conduct since no previous extension had been for less than 30 
days. 
On September 9, 1987, Kelley retained Utah counsel 
and an appointment was made for Kelley's counsel to review First 
Security's files. First Security failed to keep the appointment 
but extended the closing deadline to September 22, 1987, and 
committed to provide by that date information, title opinions 
and research on the water and boundary problems. By the time 
First Security terminated the Agreement, no such information 
had been provided for Kelley's review nor had First Security 
tendered a deed to Kelley which was a requirement to closing 
under any interpretation of the Agreement. Under these 
circumstances, Kelley acted reasonably in refusing to close on 
First Security's terms. 
It follows that after Kelley failed to close the 
Agreement on September 22, 1987, he did not breach the Agreement, 
and when he deposited his down payment in the amount of 
$124,408.86 into court on October 9, 1987, First Security's duty 
of performance arose.. The down payment was transferred from 
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escrow and tendered into court 31 days after the receipt of First 
Security's September 4 letter. The first two extensions offered 
by First Security and accepted by Kelley were 30-day extensions, 
while the last such extension was a 60-day extension. Clearly, 
when reiewed in the light of the past history, missed appointments 
and unobtained documents, Kelley's tender 31 days after "First 
Security's precipitous and unexpected demand to close was not 
unreasonable. In fact, First Security made no effort to traverse 
the affirmative, sworn stipulation of Mr. Kelley relating to 
unreasonableness of the closing demand. 
IV. 
FIRST SECURITY BREACHED THE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
A. The Agreement Required First Security to Fujrnish Good and 
Marketable Title to the Property. 
The Agreement between Kelley and First Security provided 
that First Security would furnish good and marketable title to 
the Property. Section 3 of the Agreement (R.16) provides as 
follows: 
Seller represents that Seller holds title to 
the property in fee simple. Transfer of Seller's 
ownership interests shall be made as set forth 
in Section F. Seller agrees to furnish good 
and marketable title to the property, subject 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, 
evidenced by a current policy of title insurance 
in the amount of the purchase price. 
For title to property to be marketable, "stitle must 
be such as to make it reasonably certain that it will not be 
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called into question in the future so as to subject the purchaser 
to the hazard of litigation with reference thereto.'" Hedaecock 
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 676 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1983), citing, Morlev v. Gieseker, 142 Colo. 490, 351 P.2d 392 
(1960). See also, Edwards v. St. Paul Title Insurance Co., 563 
P.2d 979 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Michaelson v. Tieman, 541 P.2d 
91 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Darby v. Keeran, 211 Kan. 133, 505 
P.2d 710 (Kan. 1973). 
An erroneous property description renders title 
unmarketable. In Hedaecock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., the court 
held that title was unmarketable where the property description 
used by the title company in its policy of insurance was faulty 
in a number of respects, including a metes and bounds description 
from which it was impossible to determine the property's location 
on the ground. The trial court concluded that "xthe uncertainty 
caused by the description is so great that a failure of title 
to the property occurs,' and s[1]itigation over the property 
was a possibility.'" 676 P.2d at 1210. 
Similarly, in Michaelson v. Tieman, 541 P. 2d 91 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1975), another case involving a faulty metes and bounds 
description, the court stated as follows: 
The standard to be applied in disputes of 
this type is not that the complainant must 
show a "reasonable probability of litigation" 
in order to have title held unmarketable, 
but rather that the party asserting the 
validity of the title must show with 
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reasonable certainty that litigation will 
not occur, "The title must be such as to 
make it reasonably certain that it will not 
be called into question in the future so as 
to subject the purchaser to the hazard of 
litigation with reference thereto." 
Id. at 92. 
By First Security's own admission in the Armstrong 
Complaint, title to the Property was unmarketable. Paragraph 17 
alleges as follows: 
17. As the result of a discrepancy between 
the description of the Subject Property contained 
in plaintiff's Quit-Claim Deed and the actual 
property occupied by the Princes [First 
Security's predecessors], enclosed by fences, 
and bounded in part by a spring and ditch, 
plaintiff was, and is, unable to convey 
marketable title to the Subject Property. 
(R.29-30) 
The Complaint further alleges the Armstrongs refused 
to exchange deeds as requested by First Security, allegedly for 
the purpose of frustrating First Security's sale of the Property. 
(R.30) 
These allegations indicate that on April 20, 1987, First 
Security believed that it was required to provide marketable 
title which was precluded by the boundary and water problems. 
Obviously, if First Security felt that title was marketable 
irrespective of the boundary or water problems or that it had 
no obligation to furnish marketable title, it would not have 
filed the Armstrong Suit. 
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Moreover, the very fact that the Armstrong Suit existed 
is clear evidence that the hazard of litigation was not merely 
a possibility, but rather, a reality. Given this circumstance, 
First Security could not convey marketable title as provided 
in the Agreement between the parties. 
Leucadia argues that the hand-written phrase inserted 
in paragraph 11 of the Agreement relieved First Security of the 
requirement to furnish marketable title: "property sold xas 
is' without warranty. Title conveyed by Special Warranty Deed 
Corp. Form." (R.16) First Security fails to point out that the 
hand-written insertion also provides that "[all] other terms 
to remain the same." 
Contrary to Leucadia's assertion, the hand-written 
provision that the conveyance will be by "special warranty deed" 
and that the property is sold "as is without warranty" did not 
alter First Security's obligation to furnish marketable title. 
In the context of agreements for the purchase of real property, 
a promise to furnish marketable title is entirely compatible with 
conveyance by warranty deed, special warranty deed or quit-claim 
deed. In other words, a provision requiring the seller to furnish 
marketable title does not necessarily imply that the seller must 
convey the property by warranty deed only. Department of Public 
Works and Buildings v. Halls, 220 N.E.2d 167 (111. 1966); Lininaer 
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v. Blackhills Greyhound Racing Association, 149 N.W.2d 413 (S. 
D. 1967). 
Similarly, if the seller agrees to convey only by a 
quit-claim deed, an implied covenant that title will be marketable 
is not negated. Wallach v. Riverside Bank, 100 N.E. 50 (N.Y. 
1912). Thus, First Security's insertion in the Agreement that 
it will convey title by special warranty deed, corporate form, 
is compatible with the provision in paragraph 3 of the Agreement 
that it must furnish marketable title. 
Nor does the fact that First Security agreed to sell 
the property "as is without warranty" relieve it of the 
requirement that it convey marketable title. The insertion of 
"as is without warranty" can only refer to the physical condition 
or habitability of the property and not to any implied warranties 
of title, as Leucadia seems to argue. From the time that a 
contract for the sale of real property is executed, and continuing 
up to the time when the deed is delivered and accepted, there are 
no implied warranties of title that can be disclaimed. Indeed, 
the seller need not even have title to the property at the time 
the contract for sale is executed. "[T]he law does not require 
the vendor to have clear and marketable title at all times during 
the performance of his contract, and is not ordinarily so obliged 
until the time comes for him to perform." Corporation Nine v. 
Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973). See also. 
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Callister v. Millstream Associates, Inc., 738 P.2d 662 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (seller does not have to have marketable title 
during the executory period of a contract). 
Because there are no implied warranties of title 
associated with the contract of sale, the only warranties that 
can be disclaimed by a seller at the time the contract of sale 
is executed are the warranties of habitability, good and 
workmanlike construction or compliance with building codes. 
All of these warranties concern the physical condition of the 
property, not the status of its title. See Schepps v. Howe, 
665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983); Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 443 N.E.2d 36 
(111. App. 1982); Tibbitts v. Qpenshaw, 425 P.2d 160 (Utah 1967); 
Mulkev v. Waggoner, 338 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. App. 1985). 
Moreover, if the "as is without warranty" clause 
referred to warranties of title which, as shown above, it cannot, 
it would be inconsistent with First Security's promise to convey 
by special warranty deed. 
B. Failure of the Seller to Deliver Marketable Title Constitutes 
a Breach of the Seller's Contract. 
Because the boundary line and water rights problems 
existed, First Security was unable to furnish marketable title. 
This failure constituted a breach of the Agreement, Willcox 
Clinic, Ltd., v. Evans Products Co., 136 Ariz. 400, 666 P.2d 
500 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) reh'g denied, thereby rendering any 
tender of performance by Kelley unnecessary. 
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Leucadia also argues that First Security merely agreed 
to convey property located at 320 Snows Lane in Park City, Utah, 
and that by describing the property by its address, First 
Security made no representations concerning the location of 
boundary lines or water rights. Accordingly, First Security 
asserts that it was capable of delivering clear title to the 
land that it agreed to convey, whether the northern property 
line was 15.22 feet farther to the north or to the south. 
Further, according to Leucadia, since water rights are real 
property and are conveyed with the land unless expressly reserved 
by the grantor, and since no representations were made concerning 
which water rights were appurtenant to the property, Kelley merely 
contracted to buy whatever water rights existed. 
The fact that property subject to a purchase agreement 
is described in the Agreement by its street address does not 
negate the seller's obligation to convey the property that the 
parties agreed constitutes the subject of their agreement. The 
terms of an agreement must only be reasonably certain so as to 
allow the parties to know what is required of them and definite 
enough to allow courts to delineate the intent of the contracting 
parties. Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). Any 
ambiguities inherent in the language used to describe the property 
being sold may be explained by extrinsic evidence as to the 
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parties' intent. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 
Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955). 
In Reed v. Alvey, the contract described the property 
as the "corner of Hillview and Ninth East." The purchaser sued 
for specific performance of the contract, but the trial court 
found in favor of the defendant on the ground that the contract 
was too vague to be enforced by a decree of specific performance. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed. Although conceding that the 
description "corner of Hillview and Ninth East" was vague and 
incomplete on its face, the Supreme Court held that the extrinsic 
evidence presented by the plaintiff concerning the transaction 
defined the subject matter in question in sufficient detail to 
support a decree of specific performance. According to the 
Court: 
Thus, everyone connected with the deal knew 
what land was involved and the ambiguous 
nature of the terms used in the written 
agreement when viewed in light of the 
extraneous evidence presented at trial does 
not render the contract unenforceable or 
defeat an action for specific performance. 
Id. at 1378. 
In Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
the plaintiff and a group of doctors agreed to a land exchange. 
The earnest money agreement stated that the doctors would purchase 
the plaintiff's Nine-Mile Ranch along with 80 acres of plaintiff's 
150-acre farm and 180 shares of water stock, but it didn't 
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describe which 80 acres the plaintiff was to convey. The doctors 
failed to perform and, at trial, claimed that the agreement was 
too indefinite to enforce. The trial court and this Court 
disagreed holding that the contract need not contain every 
particular of the agreement; rather, the crucial factor is that 
the parties agreed on each essential element of the agreement. 
Accordingly, this Court held that the trial court properly 
received extrinsic evidence to show that the parties had agreed 
that a specific 80 acres owned by plaintiff were to be transferred 
to the doctors. 
First Security's Complaint against the Armstrongs 
repeatedly asserts that First Security owned and intended to 
convey to Kelley, that land "substantially enclosed by fences, 
a spring and a ditch," along with sufficient water rights to 
maintain the aesthetics of the Property. Thus, it was undisputed 
before the trial court that the address used in the Agreement 
to describe the Property was intended by the parties to include 
that land substantially enclosed by fences, a spring and a ditch 
with all appurtenant water rights, and it is that Property that 
First Security was obligated to convey. 
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V. 
KELLEY'S TENDER OF THE DOWN PAYMENT FOR THE PROPERTY, 
RATHER THAN BEING IMPERFECT, AS DEFENDANT ASSERTS, WAS 
NOT EVEN REQUIRED SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PERFORM 
The law does not require a contracting party to do a 
"useless act and tender performance where the other contracting 
party cannot or will not perform his part of the agreement . " 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), citing 
Jenson v. Richens, 442 P.2d 636, 639 (Wash. 1968) (Where vendors 
had undertaken to deliver an encumbrance-free title, the court 
held that the promise to furnish good title is a condition 
precedent to the promise to purchase.). See also, McFadden v. 
Wilder, 6 Ariz. App. 60, 429 P. 2d 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (Where 
the seller does not tender marketable title, the duty of the 
purchaser to tender performance does not arise; the seller is, 
therefore, not excused from performance). 
In Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977) the 
purchaser sued to compel specific performance of an agreement 
to purchase residential property. The agreement provided that 
the defendant would furnish marketable title with a title 
insurance policy in the purchaser's name. Upon receipt of the 
title insurance policy, however, the real estate broker realized 
that the property was burdened by a federal tax lien and several 
other exceptions to title. The broker contacted each party 
regarding these title problems and she was instructed to resolve 
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them as soon as possible. On the original closing date, the 
purchaser had sufficient funds to make the payment required by 
the agreement but did not tender payment. After several meetings 
and a delay of six weeks, the real estate broker informed the 
vendor that all of the problems had been resolved and that closing 
could be accomplished at any time. It was at that time that 
the vendor first indicated that he was no longer interested in 
closing the transaction. About a month later, the real estate 
broker again contacted the vendor to secure the closing. The 
vendor then stated that since the purchaser had failed to make 
the payment required by the contract on the first closing date, 
he recognized no further obligations under the contract. Upon 
the vendor's continued refusal to cooperate, the purchaser sued 
for specific performance. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding 
that the vendor could not demand payment from the purchaser since 
furnishing marketable title was a condition precedent to any such 
demand: 
Inasmuch as under the contract it was the 
defendant's responsibility to furnish good 
title and a title insurance policy, the 
furnishing thereof was a condition precedent 
to his right to demand payment from the 
purchaser (plaintiff). 
It is fundamental that a party to a contract 
should obtain no advantage from the fact that 
he is himself unable to perform. Since the 
defendant had not come forth with the agreed 
title insurance policy demonstrating that he 
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could convey a clear and marketable title as 
of the proposed closing date, March 8, 1974, 
he could neither demand payment by the 
plaintiff on that date, nor claim that the 
latter was in default for failing to make 
the payment. 
Id.at 1126. See also, Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1974); Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912). 
In this case, First Security was required to furnish 
marketable title as a condition precedent to its right to demand 
that Kelley tender the down payment specified in the Agreement. 
The fact that First Security was unable to furnish the title 
called for by the Agreement excused Kelley's tender of 
performance. King v. Allen, 398 N.E.2d 510 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1980). 
As in Huck v. Hayes, the delays in closing were solely 
due to First Security in its pursuit of the quiet title action 
against the Armstrongs so that it could fulfill its obligations 
under the Agreement. When First Security finally decided in 
early September that it no longer wished to sell the property 
to Kelley, it demanded that Kelley perform within an unreasonably 
short period of time; then, when Kelley was unable to meet First 
Security's arbitrarily imposed deadline, First Security declared 
that Kelley had failed to perform and that it would not, 
therefore, go through with the sale. "One party to a contract 
cannot by willful [sic] act or omission make it impossible or 
difficult for the other to perform and then invoke the other's 
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non-performance as a defense." Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d 
857, 859 (Utah 1979). 
In this case, the failure of First Security to provide 
marketable title prevents it from complaining about Kelley's 
performance. Kelley's only "failure" was his unwillingness to 
meet defendant's September 22, 1987, deadline. Despite First 
Security's unreasonable notice and the problems surrounding title 
to the Property, Kelley remained ready, willing and able to 
perform under the contract and did in fact place funds in an 
account in Williamsburg Savings Bank in Salt Lake City, to be 
used for the down payment, which funds were shortly thereafter 
placed into an interest-bearing account with the Clerk of the 
Court. 
Moreover, Kelley's September 22, 1987 letter was not 
conditional. It merely demanded that First Security perform as 
agreed: convey marketable title to the Property and the water 
rights that both First Security and Kelley intended and agreed 
would be conveyed. (See R.l-62, Complaint dated September 22, 
1987, entitled William Kelley v. First Security Mortgage Co.. 
Civil No. 9532 filed concurrent with the September 22, 1987, 
letter to First Security's counsel.) 
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VI. 
KELLEY IS ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
WITH RESPECT TO THE INTEREST WHICH 
FIRST SECURITY CAN TRANSFER 
In Reed v. Alvev, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the rule regarding the availability of 
specific performance as a remedy: 
Generally, in a suit for specific performance 
of a contract for the sale of realty, the 
purchaser must show that he paid the purchase 
price, or tendered it, to the defendant prior 
to the commencement of the suit. However, 
an action for specific performance may also 
be maintained if the plaintiff presents an 
excuse for his failure to make such payment 
or tender and avers his ability, readiness 
and willingness to pay the contract amount. 
Id. at 1379. 
In Reed v. Alvey, the purchaser agreed to purchase 
commercial property on which the vendor was constructing a four-
plex. After signing a standard form earnest money agreement 
and offer to purchase, the vendor obtained construction financing 
and began building the four-plex. Construction continued over 
the next eleven months, which the purchaser regularly monitored. 
The purchaser complained several times about the dilatory 
construction efforts of the defendants. Finally, the purchaser 
received a letter from the defendants informing him that the 
property would be available for closing in two or three weeks. 
The vendor also requested that the purchaser deposit $13,500.00 
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into an escrow account. Although disputing the necessity of 
depositing this money under the terms of their cigreement, the 
purchaser complied; however, construction again slowed and the 
plaintiff removed the money from the non-interest bearing escrow 
account. During this period the purchaser tried repeatedly to 
communicate with the vendor, but was unsuccessful. Eventually, 
the purchaser brought an action for specific performance. 
The Court, in concluding that the plaintiff could 
maintain an action for specific performance, stated as follows: 
In the present case the payment of the 
purchase price was contingent upon the 
completion of the construction of the four-
plex unit. Since, prior to the institution 
of this suit, the defendants had failed to 
complete construction, the plaintiff was 
under no obligation to tender the full 
purchase amount prior to the present 
litigation. The plaintiff's ability and 
willingness to tender the purchase amount as 
averred in his complaint is sufficient to 
support a suit for specific performance of 
the contract in this situation. 
Id. at 1379. 
Because the vendor had subsequently encumbered the land, 
the Court required that the vendor remove the encumbrance prior 
to the purchaser taking possession of the property. The Court 
stated that: 
This can be accomplished either by a reduction 
in the purchase price, in the amount of the 
encumbrance, or payment of the total price 
after defendants remove the encumbrance. 
Id. at 1380. 
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Even though First Security could not convey the quality 
of title called for by the Agreement, it was obligated to convey 
title and abate the purchase price. Where a vendor of real estate 
cannot convey all that he contracted to convey in an earnest 
money agreement, the purchaser has the right to insist upon 
performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able to 
perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency or defect. Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 
1282 (Utah 1976) . 
In Castagno, the defendants, vendors, had agreed to 
convey 40 acres of land, together with all water rights, including 
one-second foot of water in and to a well. However, the vendors 
were unable to procure water rights for the well. The real 
property had a value of $1,500.00 per acre if one-second foot 
of water was available, but without water, its value was only 
$500.00 per acre. 
The trial court ordered conveyance of the property 
with a rebate on the purchase price and the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the vendors' argument that they should not have to convey 
since the purpose of the contract had been frustrated because 
of the defendants' inability to convey the water rights. The 
Court stated that the purchasers were entitled to specific 
performance and an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency or defect. See, also. Reed v. Alvey, 
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610 P.2d at 1380; Atkin v. Cobb, 663 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1983) . 
Kelley was entitled to specific performance of the 
Agreement on the ground that he not only tendered the required 
down payment to the defendant within a reasonable time after 
being informed that the defendant desired to close by September 
15, 1987, even though the tender was unnecessary, but he also 
was ready, willing and able to perform in a timely fashion. 
By its conduct, First Security waived timely performance under 
the Agreement and could not then set an unreasonable deadline 
and fault Kelley for untimely performance. 
Even if Kelley7s tender of performance was found to 
be untimely, any such defect is excused under the rule enunciated 
in Reed v. Alvey. Thus, Kelley need not have performed according 
to the terms of the Agreement since Kelley was ready, willing 
and able to perform but was delayed and, therefore, excused by 
First Security's conduct. Any delay in tendering the down payment 
was fully justified under the circumstances, and Leucadia cannot 
now attempt to charge Kelley with non-performance. In sum, 
Kelley was entitled to specific performance since he performed 
his obligations under the Agreement within a reasonable period 
of time, his performance was excused since he was ready, willing 
and able to perform but was prevented from doing so by the 
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defendant or his tender was effective to put First Security in 
breach. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments s£t forth above, and the cases 
cited therein, this Court should affirm the trial court's Partial 
Summary Judgment granting Kelley a decree of specific performance 
on the grounds that, based upon the undisputed facts, Kelley's 
tender of performance was neither untimely nor defective and/or 
was unnecessary. Consequently, Kelley was entitled to specific 
performance as a matter of law. 
Dated this £/ day of January, 1989. 
SEN, Esq. 
CHARLES P./SAMPSON, Esq. 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
(Original Signature) 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, 
through or under it to WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., grantee, of 
P. 0. Box 257, Hull, Massachusetts 02045, for the sum of TEN AND 
NO/100 DOLLARS and other consideration, the following described 
tracts of land in Summrnit County, State of Utah: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein and made a part 
hereof. 
Grantor makes no warranty as to the effect of any of the following: 
1. An action pending in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for the County of Summit, 
State of Utah, entitled First Security Moctgage 
Company, a Utah corporation (successor in interest 
to R E H, Incorporated), Plaintiff, vs. Hebert S. 
Armstrong, William Melbourne Armstrong, 
Joseph F. Ringholz and Raye C. Ringholz 
and filed as Civil No. 9447, records of 
County, Utah. 
Jr., 
Defendants, 
Summit 
Lis Pendens in said action was recorded on July 10, 
1987, as Entry No. 273994, in Book 438, at Page 20, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
An action pending in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for the County of Summit, 
State of Utah, entitled William R. Kelley, Jr., 
Plaintiff, vs. First Security Mortgage Company, a 
Utah corporation, et al., Defendant, filed as Civil 
No. 9532, records of Summit County, Utah. (See copy 
of complaint for purpose of action.) 
Lis Pendens in said action was recorded 
September 22, 1987, as Entry No. 277037, in Book 
445, at page 193, records of Summit County, Utah. 
3, A Special Warranty Deed executed in favor of 
Leucadia Financial Corporation, dated November 25, 
1987, recorded November 30, 1987, as Entry No. 
280465, in Book 454, at Page 217, records of Summit 
County, Utah. 
4. A Quit-Claim Deed executed in favor of Leucadia 
Financial Corporation, dated November 25, 1987, 
recorded November 30, 1987, as Entry No- 280466, in 
Book 454, at Page 220, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
The officer who signs this deed hereby certifies that 
this deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized 
by the grantor. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has executed this deed as 
of this 6th day of May, 1988. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
By: 
Its: Jn*T~ S />. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
i On the 6th day of May, 1988, personally appeared before 
me Uj^^puL L. L&~Ct^ , who being by me duly sworn, did say, 
that he^is the /fasfcd.P* of First Security Mortgage Company, and 
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of its bylaws or a resolution of its board of directors, 
and said (Jv£L**r*ju U La~it*y acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same 
i on cne t>cn aay 
it i  /fa^"^,^ 
: ru t : 
l ri  s a   io   
 l
) r t i t  . 
^ <^iZf4#\ 'Notary P u b l i c r ~ J . , ~ , , 
My^G§y1j^s^pAv'Ek^res: Residing at ^ztM— 6 m ^ 7 / Lll^Uc 
EXHIBIT "A" TO SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
The real property is located in Summit County, State of Utah. 
.Said real property is also described as follows: 
Parcel No, 1: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 feet and West 
2776,80 feet from the northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 4 degrees 03' East 421.40 feet; thence South 56 
degrees 22' West 261.80 feet; thence South 50 degrees 52f West 
278.0 feet; thence South 47 degrees 34' West 500.0 feet; thence 
North 28 degrees 34' West 538.0 feet to the center line of a 
ditch; thence North 53 degrees 10' East 36.0 feet along said 
ditch to an old spring; thence North 40 degrees East 181.0 
feet; thence North 71 degrees East 87.0 feet; thence North 66 
degrees 38' East 147.61 feet; thence North 30 degrees 35' East 
43.50 feet; thence East 111.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees 
East 86.0 feet; thence North 37 degrees 38' East 125.0 feet; 
thence North 59 degrees 50' East 207.0 fpet; thence South 67 
degrees 05' East 23.0 feet; thence North 37 degrees 55' East 
55.0 feet; thence North 34 degrees 15' East 75.0 feet; thence 
last 43.82 feet; thence South 37.0 feet; thence South 88 
degrees 25f East 77.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 feet and West 
1776.80 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
rhence South 4 degrees 03f East 421.40 feet; thence North 53 
iegrees 40f East 112.67 feet; thence North 0 degrees 53' East 
154.74 feet; thence South 89 degrees 30' West 126.00 feet to 
:he point of beginning. 
'0GETHER WITH a right-of-way for ingress to and egress from 
>arcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 over a roadway which is 
.pproximately three rods wide, the centerline of which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
ECINNING AT a point South 2607.61 feet and West 2853.77 feet 
rota the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence .South 
89 degrees 36' East, 2597.86 feet, more or less, to the center 
of the state highway. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING from Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2, the 
following: 
BEGINNING AT a point South 2615.05 feet and West 2724.10 feet 
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point also being on a 
fence line and running thence South 1 degree 24f14,f West along 
said fence line 151.84 feet; thence North 88 degrees 25' West 
132.89 feet; 'thence North 0 degrees 16f West 150.00 feet; 
thence South 88 degrees 25* East 84.595 feet; thence North 89 
degrees 30' East 52.69 feet to the point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions, and rights of way appearing 
of record. 
ALSO SUBJECT TO the lien of general property taxes after 
January 1, 1988. 
**- 47/W256 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Summit ) 
). Alan Spriggs, County Recorder in and for Summit County. State of Utah, 
'.'> hereby certify that the attached and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy 
u mat certain J 
which appears of record m my office in Book ^/7^7 . Page *£S3 ~ -* ^ 
bang Entry No. ^ 3 JSjLjS 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official seal, this ,y day of Y/jj^/, /~jff 
- . ' I 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 290224 
David R. Ol sen , Esq . 
SUMMIT COUNTY TIT; e 
P. Q. Box 1168 £"\''u I o p«. o. i n 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 Space AboW'foV Recorder's Use 
Quit-Claim Deed i,-r,^/°_J^_ 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its 
principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., an 
individual, grantee, of P. 0- Box 257, Hull, Massachusetts 02045, 
for the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS and other consideration, the 
following described tracts of land in Summit County, State of Utah: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein and made a part 
hereof. 
The officer who signs this deed hereby certifies that 
this deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized 
by the grantor. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has executed this deed as 
of this 6th day of May, 1988. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY 
By ^L~ ^^^~ 
Its ^jr-S^S9 ^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
. On the 6th day of May, 1988, personally appeared before 
me (JS&OYU<-*> C&?' ^^f^M ' w h o being by me duly sworn, did 
say, that/he is the /fe$A U.K of First Security Mortgage 
Company, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of its .bylaws or a/resolution of its 
board of directors, and said /uJci^pM^ L- L<2*<JmX acknowledged to 
me that said corporation execu t ed she same. 
£@3$\ /Hb^X <X^k 
<$>% Notary Public- /, -^
 L ^ , y yj_ 
EXHIBIT "A" TO QUITCLAIM DEED 
The real property is located in Summit County, State of Utah. 
Said real property is also described as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 2615.05 feet and West 2724.10 feet 
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
89°30,0O" East 73.31 feet; thence South 00a53'00" West 369.97 
feet; thence South 53o40,00" West 112.67 feet; thence South 
56°22'00" West 261.80 feet; thence South 50o52,00M West 278.0 
feet; thence South 47°34'00" West 500.00 feet; thence North 
28o34'00M West 550.31 feet to the center line of a ditch; 
thence North 53°10'00" East 43.37 feet along said ditch to an 
old spring; thence along said centerline of ditch the following 
twelve courses: thence 1) North 40°00'00" East 181.00 feet; 
thence 2) North 71o00'00,, East 87.00. feet; thence 3) North 
66o38,00,* East 147.61 feet; thence 4) North 30°35,00" East 
43.50 feet; thence 5) East 111.00 feet; thence 6) North 
45°00'00M East 86.00 feet; thence 7) North 37o38,00" East 
125.00 feet; thence 8) North 59°50,00" East 207.00 feet; thence 
9) South 67°05'00" East 23.00 feet; thence 10) North 37°55"00" 
East 55.00 feet; thence 11) North 34°15'00" East 75.00 feet; 
thence 12) East 43.82 feet; thence South 37.00 feet; thence 
North 88°25'00" West 7.60 feet; thence South 00°16'00" East 
150.00 feet; thence South 88°25'00" East 132.89 feet; thence 
North 01°24'14" East 151.84 feet to the point of beginning. 
ST ATI: OF UTAH ) 
CotM>»v of Sommit ) 
t A|t-,«' Sf;f»^f)s C^u^W Recorder >n and for Summit County State of Utah 
r':« nei^tv cenuy thai the attached anu foregoing is a hjii true and correct c^py 
o» ''Mt certain ./ 
v.hich appears "it record in my oltirc in Hoo* • •' , P u^ o 
being Erd\\ No ^ - • - ^ , 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto ret my n n»f -nd aff»NPi ^v 
c'fic.tii seal fnis / y day'jf *//} « %y. 
